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The Support Programme supported public sector
departments (the EPWP Unit and Sector Lead Departments) to implement a
cross cutting national programme (the EPWP). A cross cutting programme
is one that seeks to derive additional outcomes through the delivery
of existing mandates. Through this process lessons were learnt both in
terms of implementing cross cutting programmes and supporting cross
cutting programmes. These are set out below.
Implementing cross cutting programmes
Key learning’s from the Support Programme experience
in respect of implementing cross cutting programmes are as follows:
1) Clear mandates, budgets and roles: A cross
cutting programme can only be effective if the parties that are
required to participate have clear mandates, budgets and roles in
respect of their primary mandate. If these are in place then it is
possible to insert additional outcomes that will meet the objectives
of the cross cutting programme. For example in the Infrastructure and
Environmental Sectors there was clarity on the programmes and entities
participating and their budgets and roles. It was therefore relatively
easy to engage with them on their programmes and these Sectors were
successful in achieving their targets. In the Social Sector there was
constant debate and confusion as to whether or not HCBC and ECD are
part of the EPWP and in addition it was extremely difficult to
identify budgets and roles. Accordingly it was much harder to apply
the EPWP in this sector.
2) Inserting cross cutting outcomes in a practical and sensitive
manner: A cross cutting programme will add additional requirements
onto the way in which a responsible Line Departments fulfills its
mandate. Accordingly inserting the additional outcomes should be
undertaken in a practical and sensitive manner that is based on an
understanding of how the Line department operates in terms of
fulfilling its normal business. Importantly, it should be designed in
close cooperation with the line departments responsible for the
delivery of the primary mandate. Achieving the outcomes of the cross
cutting programme should not undermine the achievement of the Line
Departments primary mandate. For example it was clear that increasing
labour intensity is more practical in respect of small local roads
than large main roads.
3) Incorporating the outcomes into individual officials performance
indicators: Unless the outcomes of the cross cutting programme are
incorporated into the key performance indicators of the relevant
officials who are responsible for the budgets to implement projects
and programmes necessary to achieve the cross cutting outcomes, at
both Senior and operational level, they will not be achieved.
4) Authority: The requirement that the outcomes of a cross
cutting programme are incorporated by Line Departments into the way in
which they implement their primary mandate, must be issued through an
appropriate authority. When DPW was seen as the Department responsible
for the EPWP, Line Departments did not take it seriously. It was only
when the EPWP became a Presidential directive that Line Departments
started to comply. The fact that the Presidency and Treasury support
and issue instruction in respect of the second phase of the EPWP is a
key success factor.
5) Using existing structures: In order to ensure that a cross
cutting programme is incorporated into government systems it is
important that it forms part of the existing structures of the system.
A problem with the first phase of the EPWP was that it set up its own
independent structures (for example Sectors and Sector coordinating
meetings). These did not work effectively and the EPWP would have been
implemented more easily if it used existing structures such as the
Presidency and Executive Committee meetings, the Clusters, Minmec etc.
Supporting the implementation of cross cutting programmes
Key learning’s from the Support Programme experience
in respect of implementing cross cutting programmes are as follows:
1) Engaging with specific project issues: The Support Programme
recognized that it needed to focus on a particular problem area to try
and implement the EPWP, rather than try and transform the system as a
whole. Accordingly the Support Programme focused on particular issues
such as Municipal delivery in the Infrastructure Sector, domestic
waste collection in the Environmental Sector etc. The Support
Programme then directly engaged in the identified area so as to
understand it better and to identify how the EPWP outcomes could be
achieved, while still achieving the primary mandate. This allowed the
Support Programme to identify and apply practical solutions and to
engage with Officials from a basis of practically understanding the
operational challenges that they were dealing with.
If the programme had tried to develop broad capacities and solve all
problems it is unlikely that it would have made any progress. By
engaging with specific project issues, in a focused and direct manner,
it enabled the Support Programme to have an immediate impact, and also
allowed it to develop far greater insights into the nature of the
challenges and the way in which these could be addressed.
This allowed for a number of interventions to be implemented which
have been integrated into the activities of the EPWP Unit and
implementing departments such as the engagement methodology with
Municipalities, the Provincial Roads, Domestic Waste and Large Project
programmes and the MIS.
A key success factor in terms of achieving the above was that the
Support Programme had a large amount of funding and a long enough time
frame [five years] within which to make a significant impact. In
addition that the funding from the Business Trust came without any
strings attached, other than performance in respect of supporting the
implementation of the EPWP. This was unique in that most donors do
have other agendas.
 2)
Targeted flexibility: The Support Programme was required to
meet specified targets and was rigorously monitored in respect of the
achievement of these targets. The targets were directly linked to
those of the EPWP. A clear focus on these targets meant that the
Support Programme undertook its activities in a manner that constantly
ensured that the agreed upon targets would be realized. This forced
the Support Programme to be focused and to prioritise its activities
and limited the temptation to be sidetracked into other issues.
The strategic review process at the end of each financial year and the
requirement to develop annual business and operational plans for the
next year reinforced this process.
Critically, together with the targets there was a high level of
flexibility allowed by the Business Trust regarding the methods
employed to get there. This allowed the Support Programme to
continually reflect on its activities and revise accordingly. There
was a strong emphasis on reflection and learning. The regular M&E
process and the Learning Workshops allowed reflection on work that had
been undertaken and revisions to be made. The application methodology
applied was to innovate, monitor and review performance, identify the
learning’s and then refine. This is iterative and was undertaken on an
ongoing basis.
Flexibility was further allowed through a willingness to adjust and to
change. The Support Programme was not afraid to change how and what it
was doing. One of the strengths of the Support Programme was its
ability to be creative and responsive and to change easily. It was
also that the Business Trust allowed the Support Programme to do this
and did not hold them to contractual requirements set up at the
beginning of the five year time frame.
3) Innovation: The approach adopted allowed high levels of
innovation. The reason for this was that the Support Programme
operated outside of the public sector. The Support Programme was not
burdened with bureaucratic accountability and responsibilities as are
government officials. It could address a problem outside of the
government system and do it in a more focused manner. The findings
where then brought back into the system. It is noted that factors
within the public sector may not allow a direct translation from an
approach that was effective within a context that operated outside of
government. However, certain approaches – such as target based
management – can be integrated effectively into the existing framework
of government.
Innovation was further supported by a strong culture developed of
strategic thinking. Problems were researched and strategically
analysed with an openness to finding new solutions and then to testing
them.
4) Cultivating a Partnership: The Support Programme was
undertaken in response to a need expressed by government, and there
was a strong emphasis on working with the EPWP Unit and other relevant
government departments. This permeated all aspects of the running of
the programme, with joint task teams making key decisions and
determining the direction of the programme, the alignment of strategic
processes etc.
The willingness of the partners to reflect on learning, to acknowledge
areas of strength and weakness was also vital to the success of the
programme.
Good relationships between the team providing support and those
receiving support was critical to forming a strong partnership. An
unusually good relationship between the EPWP Unit and the Support
Programme exists. There is trust and respect and each values what the
other party is doing. Committees and engagement were undertaken in a
manner whereby the two parties could interact in a non-confrontational
way.
The partnership between the EPWP Unit and the Support Programme was
very much about playing to people’s relative strength – what are
people good at and then giving them accountability and structure.
Building a strong partnership was reinforced by the fact that the
Support Programme never got into competition with the EPWP Unit and
never tried to promote itself to the detriment of the EPWP Unit.
Everything it did it was about being the support agency and ensuring
the EPWP Unit got the credit. This was beneficial in building the
relationship between the EPWP Unit and the Support Programme. However,
a problem that did emerge was that sometimes that Support Programme
was undervalued. A delicate balance needs to be maintained between
reporting Support Programme contributions and enhancing the confidence
and credibility of the team being supported.
5) Willing partners: A support programme can only assist
accelerated delivery if it is being undertaken with the body
responsible for the implementation of this delivery and the Officials
who receive support, are under pressure to deliver in the area where
support is being offered and want the support. Support is only
effective if offered directly to the entity that has the mandate to
deliver the specific service or product.
Willingness is also not sufficient for the support to be effective,
the willing partner must also have the capacity to take on the
support. If there is inadequate capacity, support is inappropriate and
a more direct intervention is probably indicated which focuses on
directly delivering on the inputs needed for the achievement of the
required outcomes.
6) Strategic Technical Assistance Fund: The STAF fund was a
unique component to the programme which served a very useful purpose,
both in researching and addressing pressing issues, but also to build
the relationship between the EPWP Unit and the Support Programme. It
was useful in that it directly responded to priorities within the EPWP
Unit and the work undertaken and was well integrated into influencing
the activities of the Support Programme. While the fund was
discretionary it had a strong strategic focus in part achieved through
its joint management by the EPWP Unit and Support Programme.
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